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ABSTRACT
Plaintiffs whose reputations have suffered irreparable injury from the
distribution of defamatory statements have generally been permitted by law to
recover damages from the enterprises that distributed the publications known to
contain the defamatory material. However, when the enterprise that knowingly
distributed the injurious content is an Internet service provider ("ISP"), present
law denies that same plaintiff recovery. This perception of ISP immunity flows
from a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., where the Court extended certain immunities

offered by the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (the "CDA"). In Zeran,
the Fourth Circuit interpreted the CDA's express grant of "publisher" immunity
to Internet service providers as including immunity from liability as a "distributor" as well. This decision, however, has left those who suffer irreparable harm
from the distribution of such material without legal recourse, even when the
ISP that has distributed such material knows or has reason to know of its defamatory content.
This Article offers a comprehensive examination of this issue and a critique of the Fourth Circuit's decision. It includes a thorough discussion of why
the plain meanings of the relevant provisions of the CDA, the legislative history and purposes of those provisions, and the common law all suggest that this
decision was in error. It highlights the harmful consequences of that decision.
And it demonstrates that there is nothing so unique in Internet communication,
nor in the technologies associated with it, that should warrant relieving ISPs
from the responsibilities to reasonably protect persons from the irreparable
harm to reputation that can result from an ISP's knowing distribution of defamatory materials.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a well-respected business person in your community-perhaps the owner of an automobile distributorship. For many years, you
have provided members of your community with outstanding service. You have
actively contributed to the community by supporting civic organizations, sponsoring Little League teams, and, in short, investing years of time and many dollars in establishing a high level of good will.
Then, one day you read in your city newspaper an editorial letter stating that you are a convicted child molester. You are stunned-you know it is
not true but there it is in print. You call the newspaper, but you are told there is
nothing they can do about it. In a panicked state, you drive to your neighborhood newsstand to try to convince the proprietor to stop selling the papers, but
he refuses. As a result, demonstrators begin congregating around your dealership. Members of the community in which you had spent years establishing
good will suddenly shun you and your business. At night, vandals leave threatening messages painted on the vehicles on your lot. In sum, because of these
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false and defamatory statements published in the newspaper, you have lost your
established good will and are in danger of losing your business.
Under these circumstances, the law provides several remedies. First,
the author of the letter may be liable for the false and defamatory statements he
wrote about you.' Additionally, the newspaper that printed and circulated the
letter may, likewise, be similarly liable.2 Furthermore, because you informed
the newsstand owner of the falsity of the statements in the newspapers he was
distributing, even he may be liable for continuing to distribute the defamatory
statements through his business. Although nothing can truly compensate you
for the grief and humility you have experienced, the law provides at least the
opportunity to obtain financial compensation for your injuries.
Now, however, change the circumstances. Suppose that instead of the
letter appearing in a community newspaper, it is posted onto an Internet message board4 or blog.5 Following the posting, you inform the Internet Service
Provider ("ISP") hosting the board or blog that the information is false and defamatory, but the ISP refuses to remove the posting. And suppose that the Internet posting results in you being scorned by the community, in the same manner that occurred when it was printed in the newspaper. Whether in newsprint
or online, the damage to your reputation may be beyond repair. However,
although the law provided you the opportunity to sue both the newspaper and
the newsstand owner for the damages their action or inaction caused you, the

I

See generally Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (recognizing society's interest in upholding defamation judgments). See infra Part II.A. 1 for a discussion on first-party defamation
liability.
2
See Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing as
"black letter rule," that "one who republishes a libel is subject to liability just as if he had published it originally"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977) ("one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it").
See infra Part II.A.2, for a discussion on (re-)publisher liability.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1977) ("one who only delivers or transmits matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character").
4
An Internet "message board" (or "forum") is "an online discussion site where people can
hold conversations in the form of posted messages." Internet Forum, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intemetforum, (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). Early Internet forums
were, effectively, the more modem equivalent of traditional bulletin boards, and allowed individuals to post messages and comment on other messages. Id. "From a technological standpoint,forums or boards are web applications managing user-generated content." Id
The term "blog" is "a contraction of the words web log." Blog, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog, (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). It is a type of website, usually
maintained by an individual with regular entries of commentary, descriptions of events, or other
material such as graphics or video. Id. The formats for blogs vary, with many providing news or
commentary on a specific topic. Id. An important characteristic of many blogs is the ability of
readers to leave comments which may be viewed by other readers. Id.
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law, at least according to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Fourth Circuit"), provides you with no cause of action against the ISP. 6
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") of 1996 ("§
230") contains a provision expressly immunizing ISPs from liability as a "publisher" of defamatory information provided by someone else.' On its face, §
230 appears to have left "distributor" liability, as it applies to ISPs, intact. This
means that prior to intervention by the Fourth Circuit, an ISP could be held liable for information it transmitted to subscribers, if and only if, it "knew or had
reason to know" that the information was defamatory in nature 8-that is, courts
could hold an ISP that distributed defamatory materials to the same standard
that was applied to distributors of newspapers and other printed materials containing similarly defamatory materials. In Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,9 however, the Fourth Circuit interpreted § 230's grant to ISPs of "publisher" immunity as including immunity from liability as a "distributor" as well.'o
This Article will explore why the Zeran court's interpretation of § 230
was in error, as well as why ISPs should not be immune from liability as a distributor of defamatory material. Because understanding basic defamation law is
essential to understanding how that law should be applied to online communications, this Article begins with an overview of existing defamation law, starting with basic principles as they apply to the traditional media of newspapers,
books, television, and the like." This overview continues with an explanation
of how these traditional principles have been applied to cases involving electronic databases and the Internet.12 The overview section then moves on to a
brief introduction to § 230 of the CDA,13 and finally, to a short overview of the
Zeran case.14 Following the overview section, this Article continues with a discussion of why Zeran was wrongly decided,' 5 why ISPs should be subject to
6
See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-35 (4th Cir. 1997), af'g, 958 F.
Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997) (opining that the immunity for liability as a publisher of defamatory
material afforded ISPs by § 230 included immunity from liability as a distributor also).
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.").

8

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

581(1) (1977) ("[O]ne who only delivers or

transmits matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or has
reason to know of its defamatory character.").
9
129 F.3d 327.
10

See id.

"
12

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Parts II.B.1-2.

13

See infra Part II.B.3.

14

See infra Part II.B.4.
See infra Part III.A.

15
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distributor liability,16 and why Congressional legislation is an appropriate way
to regulate Internet communications. 7 Lastly, this Article concludes with a
recommendation that courts outside the Fourth Circuit reject the Zeran decision
and apply common law rules of distributor liability to relevant cases before
them. In turn, Congress should likewise modify § 230 to clarify, by express
terms, the limited scope of the immunity it affords ISPs.18
II. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LAW
A.

TraditionalDefamation Rules Under the Common Law' 9

1.

General Background and First-Person Liability

The traditional definition of defamation is "a communication to a third
person which 'tends to hold the plaintiff up to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or
to cause him to be shunned or avoided."' 20 Though this definition is still often
repeated by the courts,21 more recent cases have recognized it as being too narrow, 22 and now generally define defamation as "a communication that tends to
damage the plaintiffs 'reputation,' more or less in the popular sense-that is,
to diminish the respect, good will, confidence or esteem in which he is held, or
to excite adverse or unpleasant feelings about him."23 Furthermore, defamation
has usually been construed to collectively include the common law torts of libel
and slander,2 4 both of which involve the "publication" of defamatory material.

16
17

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.

18

See infra Part IV.

19
The purpose of this overview of traditional defamation law is to serve as a primer for readers unfamiliar with the basic tenants and theories of this area of law. It has been included in this
Article because understanding these tenants is essential to understanding how they have been,
and should be, applied to online communications. Readers familiar with traditional defamation
law, however, may wish to proceed directly to Part II.B (Defamation Law as Applied to Online
Communications), or to Part III (DISCUSSION).
20

JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWART'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS

847 n.1 (9th ed. 1994) (citing, Parmiterv. Coupland,(1840) 151 Eng. Rep. 340, 342, as originally defining the tort of defamation).
21
Id.
22
Id. at 847 n.2.
23

Id. at 847-48 n.2.

Though it has historically been impossible to define and describe with precision the differences between these two torts, (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1977)), traditionally, slander has referred to defamatory communication by way of the spoken word, and libel, to written defamatory communication. WADE, supra note 20, at 864. Recent changes in
communication technologies, such as radio and television, however, have required tinkering with
24
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It is important to understand that the term "publication," as it applies in
the realm of defamation law, is a word of art. It does not refer only to printing
or writing, but rather, "publication" occurs when defamatory words are communicated to someone other than the person being defamed. 2 5 Therefore, to be
"published," a statement only need be heard and understood by someone other
than the party making the statement and the person who is the subject of the
statement.

these traditional definitions. See id. at 865. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568 now offers
the following to aid in distinguishing between libel and slander:
(1) Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, or by its embodiment in physical form, or by any other form of
communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of
written or printed words.
(2) Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken
words, transitory gestures or by any form of communication other than those
stated in Subsection (1).
(3) The area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character of its
publication and the persistence of the defamation are factors to be considered
in determining whether a publication is a libel rather than a slander.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). While a libel is commonly published by newspaper, book, magazine, letter, circular, petition, and the like, there are other methods of publishing a libel. Id. § 568 cmt. d. For example, "[d]efamatory pictures, caricatures, statues and effigies
are libels because the defamatory publication is embodied in physical form." Id Additionally:
The wide area of dissemination, the fact that a record of the publication is
made with some substantial degree of permanence and the deliberation and
premeditation of the defamer are important factors for the court to consider in
determining whether a particular communication is to be treated as a libel rather than a slander. The publication of defamatory matter may be made by
conduct which by reason of its persistence it may be more appropriate to treat
as a libel than a slander. On the other hand, the use of a mere transitory gesture commonly understood as a substitute for spoken words such as a nod of
the head, a wave of the hand or a sign of the fingers is a slander rather than a
libel.
Id. The Restatement offers the following illustrations:
1. A procures two men to "shadow" B. They follow him from one public
place to another until the "shadowing" becomes notorious in the community.
A has libeled B.
2. A makes a gesture with his fingers in the presence of B which indicates
that C has the "evil eye," a characterization that is highly disparaging in the
community. A has slandered but not libeled C.
3. A prepares a wax figure recognizable as a representation of B and places it
among a number of effigies of famous murderers in "The Chamber of Horrors," where it is seen by a number of persons. A has libeled B.
Id. § 568 cmt. d, illus. 1-3.
25
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977).
26
See, e.g., Economopulos v. A.G. Pollard Co., 105 N.E. 896 (Mass. 1914) (finding that there
was no publication of a defamatory statement, made in English, because of those who heard the
statement, only the defendant spoke and understood the English language).
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Because a defamation action, by definition, necessarily involves the
communication of one person's views to a third person, the defendant's constitutional right to free expression under the First Amendment is implicated every
time a state court entertains a defamation action. While the First Amendment
places limitations on states' defamation laws, the Supreme Court of the United
States ("Supreme Court") has, nonetheless, recognized that "[s]ociety has a
pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation,"27 and has repeatedly upheld plaintiffs' rights to proceed in defamation
actions.28 The reason for this is probably best stated by Justice Stewart:
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than
our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty....
The destruction that defamatory falsehood can bring is, to be
sure, often beyond the capacity of the law to redeem. Yet, imperfect though it is, an action for damages is the only hope for
vindication or redress the law gives to a man whose reputation
has been falsely dishonored.29
Beyond the speaker or author who originates a defamatory statement,
others may also be liable. One such person or persons is the "republisher." Another is the "distributor." We look first at the republisher.
2.

(Re-)Publisher Liability

It is the "black letter rule" that "one who revublishes a libel is subject
to liability just as if he had published it originally." 3 This is often true even if
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (finding that a reasonable fact
finder could conclude that statements in reporter's column implied assertion that high school
coach perjured himself in judicial proceeding, and implication that coach committed peijury was
sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false and might permit defamation
recovery); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (holding that the speech or debate
clause did not protect the transmittal of allegedly defamatory material in press releases and newsletters released by a senator); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that a
newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory false statements about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against liability,
for injury inflicted, on the ground of a privilege protecting discussion of any public issue without
regard to the status of a person defamed therein).
29
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92-93.
30
Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Hoover v. Peerless Publ'ns, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
27
28
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the republisher attributes the libelous statement to the original publisher, and
even if he expressly disavows the truth of the statement.3 ' This rule is widely
recognized, and can be found in § 578 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.32
Such "republication" may occur when someone verbally repeats a
slander3 he previously heard, or a libel34 he read.3 ' Likewise, it may occur
when someone prints or reprints defamatory statements previously "published"
verbally or in writing.36 Of significance is that "[e]ach time [defamatory] material is communicated by a new person, a new publication has occurred, which is
a separate basis of tort liability." 37 Therefore, every person who reprints or otherwise "republishes" a defamatory statement becomes subject to liability to the
same extent as if he had originally published it.38
3.

Distributor Liability

A third category of persons who may incur liability for a defamatory
statement is the "distributor." A distributor is one who merely engages in the
"transfer of possession of a physical embodiment of the defamatory matter," or

Id at 60-61 (citing Hoover, 461 F. Supp. at 1209).
Id at 61 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977) ("[Olne who repeats or
otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published
it.")).
3
Slander generally refers to verbal defamation, but may consist of "the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures, or by any form of communication [except
those that constitute a libel]." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(2) (1977).
34
Libel refers to written defamation. It "consists of the publication of defamatory matter by
written or printed words, or by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form of communication which has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words. Id.
§ 568(1).
3
Id § 578 cmt. c.
36
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977).
31
32

Id. § 578 cmt. b.
Id. § 578 cmt. b. The Restatement provides several illustrations:
A states to B that he has heard that C is a felon. A is subject to liability to C.
A states to B that C has just told him that D, an unmarried woman, has given
birth to a baby. A is subject to liability to C.
A newspaper feature syndicate supplies a defamatory article to each of its
subscribing newspapers. Each paper that prints the article has published a libel for which it is separately subject to liability.
The A newspaper copies a libelous article from the B newspaper, accompanied by a statement that it was so copied. The A newspaper is subject to liability to the person defamed regardless of whether the B newspaper was privileged to publish the article.
Id. § 578 cmt. c, illus. 3-4, cmt. b, illus. 1-2 (listed in order presented).
3

38

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss1/9

8

Buelow: Re-Establishing Distributor Liability on the Internet: Recognizin
2013]

RE-ESTABLISHING DISTRIBUTOR LIABILITY ON THE INTERNET

321

one who "transmits" the same.39 Such activities could include "selling, renting,
giving or otherwise transferring or circulating a book, paper, magazine, document or phonograph record containing defamation published by a third person."40 The most common distributors are bookstores, newsstands, libraries and
other like enterprises that are not actually engaged in the publication of books,
magazines and similar materials, but who merely distribute or circulate such
materials to the public. 41 However, a telegraph or telephone company that
"transmits" a defamatory statement by connecting a call may also be considered a distributor.4 2 There is one important distinction between publisher and
distributor liability-one can be liable as a distributor "if, but only if he knows
or has reason to know" that the material he is distributing is defamatory in
character.43 Generally, a distributor, such as a newsstand, bookstore, or library,
has no duty to examine, for defamatory content, the various publications being
offered." Only when "facts or circumstances" would suggest that a particular
publication contains matter that, upon inspection, a reasonable man would recognize as defamatory, does a duty arise for a distributor to make an inspection
of the materials he is distributing.45
The reasoning for the distinction between publisher and distributor liability has its basis in the First Amendment and the public interest in assuring
that publications and information are readily available for dissemination to the
public. According to the Supreme Court, "the constitutional guarantees of the
freedoms of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing strict liability
on distributors for the contents of the material they carry."" The Court reasoned that if liability were imposed upon one who merely distributes material
that turns out to contain a defamatory statement, then

3
40
41
42
43

Id. § 581 cmt. b.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. § 581(1) ("[O]ne who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third

person is subject to liability if but only if he knows or has reasons to know of its defamatory
character." (emphasis added)).
4
Id § 581 cmt. d-e.
45
Id. For example, if a particular author or publisher has, in the past, frequently published
material that is notoriously scandalous in nature, a bookstore or library may risk exposing itself
to liability as a distributor of material from that author or publisher. Id. § 581 cmt. e. Defamatory
material that happens to appear in a book by a reputable author and publisher, however, is unlikely to result in the distributor being found liable for the distribution of the defamatory statements
contained within that book, unless the distributor had been given specific notice of its defamatory
contents. Id
46
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959) (striking down an ordinance imposing
liability upon a bookseller for possessing an obscene book, regardless of whether the bookseller
had knowledge of the book's contents).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

322

[Vol. 116

[e]very bookseller would be placed under an obligation to
make himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop.
It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an approach to omniscience. And the bookseller's burden would become the public's burden, for by restricting him the public's
access to reading matter would be restricted. If the contents of
bookshops and periodical stands were restricted to material of
which their proprietors had made an inspection, they might be
depleted indeed.47
Similarly, the Second Circuit has opined that "First Amendment guarantees have long been recognized as protecting distributors of publications. ...
Obviously, the national distributor of hundreds of periodicals has no duty to
monitor each issue of every periodical it distributes. Such a rule would be an
impermissible burden on the First Amendment.""
4.

Discerning Between Publisher and Distributor Liabilities

Sometimes, discerning whether one is a distributor, liable only for defamatory content he knew or should have known about, or a publisher, liable
even absent knowledge of defamatory content, is not an easy task. For example,
in Misut v. Mooney,49 Merlin Printing ("Merlin"), a co-defendant, was a contract printer that provided printing and related services to publishers and writers, including co-defendants Frank Mooney ("Mooney") and Main Street Press
("Main Street").50 An action for libel was brought against the defendants resulting from a series of 15 articles and editorials that were published in Main
Street's weekly newspaper.5 1 Defendant Merlin printed the newspaper at the
request of Mooney and Main Street. 5 2 While Merlin's employees "scrutinized"
the material submitted by Mooney and Main Street for "nudity, Vrofanity, and
vulgarity," it had no other input into the material that it printed.5 Specifically,
it did not undertake any investigation to determine the truth of the material that

47
Id. at 153 (quoting The King v Ewart, [1905] 25 NZLR 709 (CA) 729) (citation omitted).
Though Smith involved criminal liability, the First Amendment's guarantees are equally applicable to civil defamation cases. As recognized by the Supreme Court: "What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil
laws of libel. The fear of damage awards ... may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of
prosecution under a criminal statute." N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).

52

Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
475 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
Id. at 233.
Id
Id

s3

Id.

48

49

so
51
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it printed, confirm facts, or check sources, nor did it exercise any editorial
judgment.5 4
At issue in Mooney was whether Merlin could be held liable as a publisher.55 The court looked to a 1974 decision by the Supreme Court, where the
Court had held that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriated standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."56 Relying on the concept that "in defamation actions liability must be
based on fault," 57 the Mooney court opined that if "a printer plays a knowing
role in the publication of a libel, or acts in violation of that applicable standard
of care, [then] there is a basis for liability."58
In applying the facts of its case to the rule articulated, however, the
Mooney court found that the printer's lack of editorial control over the material
it printed resulted in a lack of knowledge of the defamatory content of that material,59 and expressly discounted any notion that Merlin's screening the materials for nudity, profanity, and vulgarity was evidence that the printer knew of
the material's defamatory content. "That the defendant Merlin may have taken
steps to enforce its own standards of decency or civility, or to assure its own
compliance with the obscenity laws of the state," opined the court, "is not an
indication that the defendant Merlin was in a position to test the truth of the
statements submitted by an independent author."60 The court dismissed the
complaint against Merlin,6' stating,
There would be far reaching implications from the imposition
of liability on a printer in a case such as this. The resulting
chilling effect could limit an author's access to printing services; or available printers might insist on an intrusive monitoring or censorship ofprinted material to protect themselves
6
from potential liability.
Similar difficulties in determining whether a party is a "publisher" or
merely a "distributor" have also arisen with regards to radio and television
54

Id

5
See id (dismissing contract printer from defamation actions because contract printer had
no reason to know that the material he printed, which was written and edited by someone else,
contained defamatory statements).
56
Id at 235 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974)).

s7
58

Id (citing Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571 (N.Y. 1975)).
Id. at 236 (emphasis added).

5

Id.

60

Id.
Id.
Idat236n.2.

61
62
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broadcasts. For example, in Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes,63 plaintiffs, apple growers
in the state of Washington, brought suit against the television show "60
Minutes," CBS, and three local CBS affiliate stations, following the airing of a
"60 Minutes" segment containing allegedly defamatory statements concerning
chemicals used to grow Washington apples.64
Among the issues presented by the case was whether a local CBS affiliate could be held liable, as a publisher, for the programming it "rebroadcasts"
to its local viewing audiences;65 or more specifically, "whether a local broadcaster who serves as a mere conduit 'republishes' by relaying an unedited
feed."66 The Auvil court, like the court in Mooney, looked to the extent to which
the defendants exercised editorial control over the material it distributed. 67 The
court noted that the network affiliates could have exercised editorial control 68 that the affiliates had "some period of time in which to review the programming and also some idea of the content"; 69 that they had been provided a telexed communique setting out the "general terms and nature of the subject matter" of the broadcast; 70 that they had the power to exercise editorial control by
virtue of their contracts with CBS;7 1 and that each network affiliate does, in
fact, at times, censor programming when it believes the content of that programming is "unsuitable for local consumptions," although none had ever preempted "60 Minutes." 7 2
In spite of the affiliates' abilities to exercise editorial control and preempt the programming, the court found that, in this case, "all three [affiliates]
merely served as a conduit";73 that "[i]t is undisputed that the affiliates exercised no [actual] editorial control over their broadcasts."7 4 The court observed
the Restatement's position that "[o]ne who only delivers or transmits defamatory material published by a third person is subject to liability . . . only if he
knows or had reason to know of its defamatory character."75 Noting that the

67

800 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
at 931.
See id at 930-32.
Id. at 931.
See id. at 931-32.

68

Id. at 931.

69

Id.

70

Id

71

Id
Id

63

SId.
65
66

72

7
74

Id

Id.

Id at 931-32 (quoting Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 727, 729 (D. Wyo.
1986)).
7
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Restatement and similar court opinions deal primarily with liability vis-A-vis
booksellers, the court opined that "there is no logical basis for imposing a duty of censorship on the visual media that does not likewise attach to the print
chain for distribution,"77 and entered summary judgment in favor of the three
local CBS affiliates.
5.

Summary of Traditional Defamation Law

Prior to the questions introduced as a result of communications expanding into the computer and Internet related areas, traditional defamation rules
have remained relatively static in recent years, and can be summarized as follows: 79
Defamation Defined - Defamation is "a communication that
tends to damage the plaintiffs 'reputation,' more or less in the
popular sense-that is, to diminish the respect, good will, confidence or esteem in which he is held, or to excite adverse or
unpleasant feelings about him."80
PublisherLiabilityfor Defamation - A person who "publishes"
a defamatory statement, either verbally or through some media
such as print, radio, or television, is liable for damages to the
person defamed, provided the statement is heard and understood by someone other than the person making the statement
and the person who is the subject of the statement. 1
76

Id.

Id. at 932 (citing Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 140 F.R.D. 450, 451-52 (E.D. Wash. 1991)).
Id.
7
These rules represent only the general rules applied to defamation actions. There are more
specific rules pertaining to certain factual scenarios, including, for example, matters of public
concern and matters pertaining to public officials. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767 (1986) (holding that where the statements are matters of public concern, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the statements are false); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (holding that a public official may not recover damages for a false and defamatory
statement concerning his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice). Because understanding these specific rules is not necessary to understanding the
subject matter of this Article, they will not be discussed.
so
WADE, supranote 20, at 847-48 n.2.
81
See Economopulos v. A.G. Pollard Co., 105 N.E. 896 (Mass. 1914) (finding that there was
no publication of a defamatory statement, made in English, because of those who heard the
statement, only the defendant spoke and understood the English language); see also
77

7

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§

568, 577 (1977) (including section comments). Some cases

however, suggest that the publication of a statement that is merely defamatory may not be sufficient to give rise to liability-that liability may only be imposed if the statement is both defamatory and false. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, 475 U.S. 767 (holding that, under the specific cir-
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Republisher Liability - "One who republishes a libel is subject

to liability just as if he had published it originally." 82

DistributorLiability - One who only delivers or transmits de-

famatory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.
While these rules represent the traditional approaches to defamation actions, applying these rules in a non-traditional world--one replete with new
technologies and approaches to communication-has, in recent years, required
more non-traditional approaches to evaluating issues.
B.

Defamation Law as Applied to Online Communications

With the advent of modem information technologies, such as computer
file transfers, subscriber bulletin boards, and the Internet, new questions have
surfaced: Should computer service providers be subject to liability when their
members or users utilize the providers' services to distribute defamatory materials? If so, to what standard of liability should they be held-that of publisher,
liable even absent any knowledge of defamatory content, or that of distributor,
liable only if the provider knew or had reasons to know the defamatory content
of material being distributed by its systems? The following cases and Congressional intervention represent attempts to forge answers to these questions.
1.

Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.84

Before the Internet became a widely used resource for electronic information exchange, several computer service companies emerged which provided personal computer access to various databases and services.85
cumstances of the case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the falsity of the defamatory
statements).
82
See Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Hoover v.
Peerless Publ'ns, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
83

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 581(1)

(1977).

776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
8s
Services offered by these companies generally included access to online encyclopedias,
shopping, and special interest forums comprised of electronic bulletin boards, interactive online
conferences, and topical databases. These computer service companies were similar to today's
ISPs in that persons with access to a personal computer equipped with a telephone modem could
utilize the telephone lines to access services. The most significant difference between how these
services functioned and how today's ISPs operate is that the older services lacked interconnectivity with other service providers through a central network, such as is available today with the In8
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CompuServe was one of these early online service providers, offering online
services through its CompuServe Information Service ("CIS"). 8 6 Subscribers,
who paid fees both for membership and time using the service, had access to
over 150 special interests forums.87 Among the forums available to subscribers
of CIS was the Journalism Forum, which focused its content on issues of interest to the journalism industry. CompuServe had contracted with Cameron
Communications, Inc. ("CCI"), an organization independent of CompuServe, to
"manage, review, create, delete, edit and otherwise control the contents" of the
Journalism Forum "in accordance with the editorial and technical standards and
conventions of style as established by CompuServe."8 8
One of the publications available on the Journalism Forum was Rumorville, USA ("Rumorville"), which provided daily reports about broadcast
journalism and journalists. 89 Rumorville was published by Don Fitzpatrick Associates ("DFA"), headed by Don Fitzpatrick, who was named as a defendant
in the case. 90 There was no employment, contractual, or other direct relationship between CompuServe and either DFA or Fitzpatrick.9 ' Rather, DFA provided its publication to the Journalism Forum under a contract with CCI. 92 The
details of the contract included provisions that DFA "accepts total responsibility for the contents" of Rumorville93 and that CCI was required to "limit access
to Rumorville to those CIS subscribers who have previously made membership
arrangements directly with DFA." 94
CompuServe neither received compensation from nor paid compensation to DFA for providing Rumorville to the Journalism Forum.95 CompuServe
also did not charge its subscribers for access to the Journalism Forum, other
than standard membership and online usage fees it charged all CIS subscribers
regardless of what CIS services they accessed. The Journalism Forum was
made available to approved CIS subscribers immediately after it was uploaded
temet. This required users to dial in to each service provider separately, and limited the user's
access to information and services to those that were available on or through the selected service
provider.
86
See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137 (describing CompuServe and the on-line services it provided).
87

Id.

88

Id. (citing Aff. of Jim Cameron (April 4, 1991)).

89

Id.

90

Id.
Id
Id

91
92
9
9"

9
96

Id (citing Aff. of Jim Cameron (April 4, 1991)).
Id

Id.
Id
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into CompuServe's data banks-its contents were not first reviewed by CompuServe. According to CompuServe, before the Cubby case was filed, CompuServe had never received any complaints about the content of Rumorville.9 8
Plaintiffs Cubby, Inc. ("Cubby") and Robert Blanchard operated a
computer database, called "Skuttlebut," which offered similar content as Rumorville, and was designed to compete against Rumorville 99 They brought this
action against CompuServe, claiming that Rumorville had, at least twice, carried false and defamatory remarks about Skuttlebut and Blanchard, and that
CompuServe had carried those defamatory remarks on its Journalism Forum.'0 0
CompuServe moved for summary judgment, arguing that even if the
statements relating to Skuttlebut and Blanchard were defamatory, CompuServe
was merely a distributor of the statements, and not a publisher of them. Therefore, because CompuServe did not know or have reasons to know of the statements, it could not be held liable for distributing them.' 0' The court substantively accepted CompuServe's argument. It opined that CompuServe's CIS is
"in essence an electronic, for-profit library that carries a vast number of publications and collects usage and membership fees from its subscribers in return
for access to the publications." 0 2 The court continued its comparison between a
traditional publication distributor and CompuServe's CIS, noting that though
CompuServe has the right to refuse to carry a given "publication" altogether,
"once it does decide to carry a publication, it will have little or no editorial control over that publication's contents."' 0 3 The court also noted that this lack of
editorial control was particularly true in this case, as the publication in question
was carried on a forum that was managed by a company unrelated to Com-

puServe.10 4
The court then applied traditional defamation law to the case, stating:
First Amendment guarantees have long been recognized as
protecting distributors of publications.

...

Obviously the na-

tional distributor of hundreds of periodicals has no duty to
monitor each issue of every periodical it distributes. Such a

97

Id.

98

Id

99

Id at 138.

100
Id The allegedly defamatory statements included comments that Skuttlebut was a "new
start-up scam"; that it was secretly accessing, "through some back door," information first published by Rumorville; and that Blanchard had been "bounced" from his previous position at
WABC. Id
101 Id
102
103

104

Id at 140.
Id

d
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rule would be an impermissible burden on the First Amendment..... A computerized database is the functional equivalent
of a more traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower standard of liability to an electronic new distributor such as CompuServe than that which is applied to a
public library, book store, or news stand would impose an undue burden on the free flow of information.'05
The court, therefore, determined that subjecting an online database service provider to liability as a publisher, which could make it liable for defamatory statements carried on its service even absent of any knowledge of the defamatory statements, was inappropriate. The court decided, instead, that the
appropriate standard of evaluating liability for such providers is that of distributor liability, which focuses on "whether [the service] knew or had reason to
know of the allegedly defamatory .. . statements."106
A key issue on which the Cubby court based its decision was that
CompuServe did not exercise any editorial control over the material it was distributing,107 and, therefore, was subject only to liability as a distributor, and not
as a publisher. It did not opine whether its decision would have been different
had CompuServe actually involved itself in the editing of the content of its
Journalism Forum. This issue, however, was addressed four years later in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co. 08
2.

Stratton Oakmont v. ProdigyServices Co.

The importance of the decision in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co.' 09 lies in the fact that it was legislatively overruled by § 230 of the
CDA."o While Stratton Oakmont does not represent the law as it stands today,
understanding the case is essential to understanding the purposes of § 230 of
the CDA.
Prodigy Services Company ("Prodigy") operated a computer network
similar in many ways to CompuServe's CIS. Among the services Prodigy of-

105
Id. (quoting Lerman v. Flynt Distribut. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984)) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1'0

Id. at 140-41.

See id. at 140 (noting that "CompuServe has no more editorial control over [the publications it carries] than does a public library, book store or newsstand, and it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine every publication it carries for potentially defamatory statements than it would be from any other distributor to do so.").
10s
No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
107

109

Id

110

See discussion infra Part I1.13.3.

i
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fered its more than two million subscribers"' was special interest "bulletin
boards."1 2 Prodigy contracted with bulletin board leaders who encouraged usage of their respective bulletin boards by participating in the discussions and
undertaking promotional efforts."' One of these bulletin boards was "Money
Talk," allegedly the "leading and most widely read financial computer bulletin
board in the United States."ll 4 Money Talk members could use the bulletin
board to post statements regarding financial matters, including stocks and investments."1
On October 23 and 25 of 1994, an unidentified bulletin board user
posted defamatory statements on Prodigy's Money Talk bulletin board about
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. ("Stratton"), a securities and investment banking firm,
and Stratton's president, Daniel Porush." 6
Among the claims brought by Plaintiffs Stratton and Porush was that
Prodig 7was liable per se, as a publisher, for the allegedly defamatory statements. " The single critical issue raised was whether Prodigy could be considered a "publisher" of the defamatory statements, and therefore liable even absent knowledge of the statements." While the CompuServe court had refused
to consider its defendant a publisher,' the Stratton Oakmont court distinguished its case from CompuServe.120 According to the Stratton Oakmont court,

the primary difference between the two cases was that CompuServe, unlike
Prodigy, did not exercise any editorial control over the content of the forum
where the allegedly defamatory statements were made.121 It noted that Prodigy

I" Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1.
112

Id

114

id.

"15

Id.

Id The posting contained the following statements: that Stratton and Porush had committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with an initial public offering ("IPO") of stock for
Solomon-Page Ltd; that the Solomon-Page IPO was a "major criminal fraud"; that the IPO was a
"100% criminal fraud"; that Porush was a "soon to be proven criminal"; and that Stratton was a
"cult of brokers who either lie for a living or get fired." Id
117
See id. (stating that claims for per se liable were among the ten causes of action brought).
116

"'

See id. at *3.

See Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (describing the standard for distributor liability-whether CompuServe "knew or had reason to know of
the allegedly defamatory .. . statements"-as "the appropriate standard of liability to be applied
to CompuServe").
120
See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (describing the distinctions between how
CompuServe and Prodigy operated their online services).
121
Id. The Stratton Oakmont court noted that in the CompuServe case, managing the forum
and editing its contents were done by Cameron Communications and that CompuServe had no
"
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operated very differently than CompuServe. First, Prodigy "held itself out to
the public and its members as controlling the content of its computer bulletin
boards."l 22 Second, it had promulgated "content guidelines" in which users had
been advised not to post "insulting" or "harass[ing]" notes.123 Finally, Prodigy
not only held itself out as controllinF the content of its bulletin boards, but then
did, in fact, attempt to do just that.12
The court stated its agreement with the case law that established that
computer bulletin board operators should generally be viewed as distributors, 2 5
much like libraries, bookstores, and television network affiliates.1 26 The court
continued, however, pointing to Prodigy's own policies, technology, and staffing decisions as distinguishing its services from those of other computer bulletin board operators, and "mandated the finding that it is a publisher." 27 The
court presumed that Prodigy's decision to regulate the contents of its bulletin
boards was, at least in part, "influenced by its desire to attract a market it peropportunity to review the contents of the online publication before it was uploaded onto CompuServe's CIS data banks and made available to subscribers. Id.
122
Id. In one marketing article, Prodigy stated:
We make no apology for pursuing a value system that reflects the culture of
the millions of American families we aspire to serve. Certainly no responsible newspaper does less when it chooses the type of advertising it publishes,
the letters it prints, the degree of nudity and unsupported gossip its editors
tolerate.
id at *2.
123
Id. at *2. These guidelines included warnings that "notes that harass other members or are
deemed to be in bad taste or grossly repugnant to community standards, or are deemed harmful to
maintaining a harmonious online community, will be removed when brought to Prodigy's attention." Id. The guidelines also stated that although "Prodigy is committed to open debate and discussion on the bulletin boards, . . . this doesn't mean that 'anything goes."' Id.
124
See id. at *2-3 (discussing the steps and means Prodigy utilized to exercise editorial control over the contents of its bulletin boards). Prodigy attempted to exercise actual editorial control
primarily through two means. First, Prodigy used a software screening program which automatically pre-screened and deleted all bulletin board postings which contained offensive language. Id.
at *2. Second, Prodigy used Board Leaders to review postings and to enforce Prodigy's standards
as to content. Id. at *2-3. The court opined that:
[Prodigy] has virtually created an editorial staff of Board Leaders who have
the ability to continually monitor incoming transmissions and in fact do
spend time censoring notes. Indeed it could be said that Prodigy's current
system of automatic scanning, Guidelines and Board Leaders may have a
chilling effect on freedom of communication in Cyberspace, and it appears
that this chilling effect is exactly what [Prodigy] wants . ...
Id. at *5.
125
The Stratton Oakmont court specifically noted its agreement with Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) and Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928
(E.D. Wash. 1992). See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5. See supra Part II.B.1 for a
discussion of Cubby. See supra Part II.A.4 for a discussion of Auvil.
126
Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
127
id.
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ceived to exist consisting of users seeking a 'family-oriented' computer service,"1 2 8 and concluded that "Prodigy's conscious choice, to gain the benefits of
editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and
other computer networks that make no such choice."l29
The Stratton Oakmont court seemed to be aware that any legal precedent, resulting from its decision to impose publisher liability upon a computer
online services provider that exercises actual editorial control over its service's
content, might be short-lived. Looking ahead towards the upcoming Congressional votes on pending legislation, the court noted that "the issues addressed
[in this opinion] may ultimately be preempted by federal law if the Communications Decency Act of 1995, several versions of which are pending in Con-

gress, is enacted."l 30
3.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996

Stratton Oakmont left the common law with a rather uncomfortable
paradox. Its position that an ISP could be held liable as a publisher of defamatory material only if the provider had exercised editorial control over its service's contents provided a strong incentive for ISPs to refrain from exercising
such control. It meant that any internet service provider that chose to close its
eyes and permit any and all communications, no matter how defamatory, obscene, or otherwise objectionable, to be communicated to others through its
service was protected from liability as a publisher. For the ISP that made serious attempts to screen for and remove such materials, however, there was no
such protection. In essence, those ISPs that made attempts to be more responsible in the materials it allowed to be disseminated through its services were
more vulnerable to tort liability than those that made no such attempts. Congress, concerned about the disincentives to restrict access to objectionable materials that Stratton Oakmont and similar decisions placed upon ISPs, added §
230131 to its already pending Communications Decency Act.13 2 Section 230
provides, in relevant part:

128
129
130
131

id
id
id
The complete text of § 230 is as follows:
230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material
(a) Findings - The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer
services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our
citizens.
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(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information
that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future
as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of
political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
(b) Policy - It is the policy of the United States (1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal
or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools
who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking
and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
(c) Protection for "good [s]amaritan" blocking and screening of offensive
material[ ]
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker - No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability - No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph (1).
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service - A provider of interactive
computer service shall, at the time of entering an agreement with a customer
for the provision of interactive computer service and in a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental control protections (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are commercially available that may assist the customer in limiting access to material
that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer
with access to information identifying, current providers of such protections.
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law - Nothing in this section shall be construed to
impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating
to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18,
or any other Federal criminal statute.
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(c) Protection for "good [s]amaritan" blocking and screening of
offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker - No [p]rovider or user
of an interactive computer service' 33 shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information by another information

content provider.13 4
(2) Civil liability - No [p]rovider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be liable on account of -

(2) No effect on intellectual property law - Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.
(3) State law - Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any
State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No
cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.
(4) No effect on Communications Privacy law - Nothing in this section shall
be construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar
State law.
(f) Definitions - As used in this section:
(1) Internet - The term "Internet" means the international computer network
of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks.
(2) Interactive computer service - The term "interactive computer service"
means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider - The term "information content provider"
means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service.
(4) Access software provider - The term "access software provider" means a
provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools
that do any one or more of the following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content.
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
132
See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
133 An "interactivecomputer service" is defined as "any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems
operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
134
An "information content provider" is defined as "any person or entity that is responsible, in
whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or
any other interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (emphasis added).
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(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access
to or the availability of material that the provider considers to
be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).13
According to the very scant legislative history pertaining to § 230, its
purpose was to provide "[G]ood Samaritan" protection for providers or users of
interactive computer services for actions taken to restrict access to objectionable material.13 6 Congress's intention in passing § 230 of the CDA was to "remove the disincentives to self-regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision."1 3 7 It was to "encourage service providers to self[-]regulate the disseminadissemination of offensive material over their services." 3 8 With its concern that
decisions like Stratton Oakmont would "deter service providers from blocking
and screening offensive material,"l 39 Congress enacted § 230 to "grant immunity to interactive computer service providers from suits arising from efforts by
those providers to screen or block content."l 4 0
While § 230 expressly relieves ISPs from liability as a publisherl 4 1 and
for exercising editorial control over its service contents,14 2 it is, on its face, silent regarding whether the scope of protection afforded was intended to include
liability as a distributor. In what has become the seminal case relevant to this
topic, as well as the focus of this Article's inquiry, this issue was addressed by
the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.14 3

13

16

47 U.S.C. § 230(c). See supra note 131 for full text of § 230.
H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194.

'37
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997), ajfg 958 F. Supp. 1124
(E.D. Va. 1997).
138
Id.
139

id.

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1134 (E.D. Va. 1997), aj'd, 129 F.3d 327
(4th Cir. 1997).
141
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
142
See id. at (c)(2)(A)--(B).
143
129 F.3d 327.
140
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Zeran v. America Online, Inc.

In Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,144 Plaintiff Kenneth Zeran brought
action against America Online ("AOL") alleging that AOL (1) unreasonably
delayed in removing defamatory messages posted on an AOL electronic bulletin board, (2) refused to post retractions regarding those messages, and then (3)
failed to screen its service for similar postings thereafter.145According to Zeran's complaint, on April 25, 1995, messages appeared on an AOL bulletin
board advertising "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts," featuring offensive and tasteless slogans related to the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City.14 6 These advertisements, posted by an
anonymous person, instructed anyone interested in purchasing the shirts to contact "Ken" at Zeran's home-business phone number.147 As a result, Zeran received a high volume of angry and derogatory phone messages, which included
death threats.14 8 Because Zeran relied on his phone availability for business, he
could not change his telephone number.14 9 Zeran called AOL to report his dilemma, and was assured by a company representative that the posting would be
removed from the bulletin board, but that AOL would not, as matter of policy,
post a retraction.150 Zeran and AOL disputed when this original posting was
removed from the bulletin board.' 5 '
Similar additional messages were posted on each of the next five consecutive days.1 52 Zeran called AOL repeatedly and was assured by company
representatives that the offending person's account would soon be closed.' By
April 30, 1995, however, Zeran was still receiving abusive phone calls, one approximately every two minutes.154 Then, on May 1, an announcer for an Oklahoma City radio station, who had received a copy of the first advertisement
posted on AOL, related the advertisement's content on the air, including the
name "Ken" and Zeran's phone number. 55 As a result, Zeran was inundated
with additional death threats and other tormenting calls from Oklahoma City

'"
145
146
147
148

Id.
Id. at 328.
Id at 329.

Id
id

149id
150

id.

151

Id.
Id
Id
Id

152
153
15

15

Id
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residents. 15 Zeran spoke to representatives of the radio station and AOL, and
finally, by May 14, after the story was exposed as a hoax by a local Oklahoma
City newspaper, and the radio station made an on-air apology, the number of
calls Zeran received subsided to about fifteen per day.'57
Zeran brought suit against AOL arguing that once he notified the company of the unidentified third-party hoax, AOL had a duty, as a distributor of
the defamatory postings, to promptly remove the defamatory messages, to notify its subscribers of the falsity of those messages, and to effectively screen for
future defamatory postings. Zeran argued that, though § 230 provided ISPs
immunity from publisher liability, it left distributor liability intact."' 9 AOL,
however, pled § 230 as an affirmative defense, claiming that the section's grant
of immunity for publisher liability encompassed liability as a distributor also.160
The Zeran court accepted AOL's argument that § 230 immunized it
from distributor liability.' 6 ' The court opined that distributor liability is merely
part of, and not distinct from, publisher liability-the distinction of requiring
notice of the offending content of questioned material before one may be subject to liability as a distributor signifies "only that different standards of liability may be applied within the larger publisher category." 6 2 According to the
Zeran court, "[t]o the extent that decisions like Stratton and Cubby utilize the
terms 'publisher' and 'distributor' separately, the decisions correctly describe
two different standardsof liability ... [they do not] suggest that distributors are
not also a type of publisher." 63
The Zeran court determined that Congress's purposes in enacting § 230
supported including distributor liability within the scope of the section's protection, and gave several specific reasons for reaching that determination. First,
considering that "[t]he amount of information communicated via interactive
computer services is ... staggering," and that imposing tort liability "in an area
of such prolific speech" would have a chilling effect on ISPs' willingness to refrain from restricting the number and types of messages posted, "Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize
service providers to avoid any restrictive efforts."'l 6 4 Second, once an ISP receives a notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it "must decide whether to

156

15
158

id
-id.
Id. at 330.
See id. at 331-32.

16o Id. at 330.
161

See id. at 330-35.

162

Id. at 332.

163

Id. (emphasis added).

16

Id.at 331.
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publish, edit, or withdraw the posting," and therefore, under those circumstances, the ISP is "thrust into the role of a traditional publisher.", 65 Third, requiring
ISPs to investigate and make legal judgments regarding complaints of defamatory postings would create "an impossible burden" on ISPs, which would result
in "a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notification" without
undertaking any investigation to determine whether or not the contents were
defamatory. Fourth, liability based upon notice would "deter service providers from regulating the dissemination of offensive material over their . .. services" as efforts to screen for such materials would naturally lead to discovery
of potentially defamatory material thereby creating a stronger basis for liability. 67 Ultimately, the Zeran court concluded that "[b]ecause the probable effects of distributor liability on the vigor of Internet Speech and on service provider[s'] self-regulation are directly contrary to § 230's statutory purposes, we
will not assume that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact."1 6 8
III. DISCUSSION

When Congress passed § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, it
expressly relieved ISPs from liability as publishers in two ways. First, it provided that an ISP will not be "treated as the publisher or speaker" of information not originating with the ISP. 169 Second, it provided that when an ISP
undertakes good faith efforts to screen out "objectionable" material, an activity
usually considered to be the exercise of editorial control by a publisher, then
that ISP could not be held civilly liable "on account of' that action. 170 It did
not, however, expressly state whether this grant of immunity as a publisher also
included immunity from liability as a distributor of defamatory materials. The
Fourth Circuit, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,17 ' had the occasion to appropriately clarify this issue. By thoroughly investigating and considering Congress's intentions and purposes in passing § 230, as well as the development of
the common law of defamation and the theoretical underpinnings, which have
made liability as a "publisher" and liability as a "distributor" of defamatory materials distinctly different, the Zeran court had the perfect opportunity to render
a proper decision, which would have been supported by each of these. The Zeran Court, however, failed to rise to that challenge and wrongly decided that

165

Id. at 332.

166

Id. at 333.

167

Id.

168

id

169

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012); see supra note 131 for complete text of § 230.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A); see supra note 131 for complete text of § 230.
'
129 F.3d 327.

170
171
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the immunity from publisher liability afforded to ISPs by § 230 includes immunity from liability as a distributor as well.
A.

Congress's Intention and Purpose in Promulgating § 230

Congress's intent in passing any federal statute is of significant importance in interpreting it. Regarding § 230, however, there is, unfortunately,
very little specific comment or direct legislative history to help determine what
that intent may have been, particularly when asking whether Congress intended
immunity for "publishers" to be inclusive of "distributors" as well. This lack of
comment concerning the issue suggests that Congress did not anticipate that
there would be any controversy over whether it intended the term "publisher"
to encompass the term "distributor" as well.
Given the lack of substantive direct legislative history or comment
concerning the issue, Congress's intent in promulgating § 230 can best be determined by reviewing four factors: (1) the plain meaning of the words of the
statute, (2) the scope of protections expressly granted by the statute, (3) the
scant legislative history that is available, and (4) the common law usage of the
terms "publisher" and "distributor." We look first to the plain meaning of the
statute.
1.

The "Plain Meaning" of the Term

On its face, the statute is silent regarding distributor liability. There are
some clues, however, offered by the language of § 230 that give some indication as to the intended scope of the protection it affords. First, the statute, by its
own terms, specifies only that an interactive computer service provider shall
not be treated as a publisher-it does not expressly relieve ISPs from liability
as a distributor.The terms "publisher" and "distributor" are common terms that
are distinct in their meanings. While, undoubtedly, there are some publishers
who also undertake the functions of a distributor, and vice versa, it is not difficult to discern between the two functions. Any ambiguity between the terms,
therefore, can only be found if one makes an extraneous inquiry. Because the
"plain meaning" of the term "publisher" is clear, that plain meaning should
have been applied by the Zeran court. According to the Supreme Court, "[i]n
determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language, giving the
'words used' their 'ordinary meaning."'l 7 2 Put in other words, "the most basic
of all canons of statutory construction [is that] statutes mean what they plainly

Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (citation omitted) (citing United States
v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)).
172
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say."l 73 This canon was explained 190 years ago by Chief Justice John J. Marshall:
The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the
words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the
words[,] there is no room for construction. The case must be a
strong one indeed, which would justify a [C]ourt in departing
from the plain meaning of words ... in search of an intention
which the words themselves did not suggest.174
Applying the plain meaning of the word, therefore, indicates that the
term "publisher" should be construed as meaning simply "publisher" and not
"publisher and distributor."
2.

Analyzing the Entire Text of § 230

In addition to the plain meaning of the word "publisher," there are other clues within the text of § 230 that help in determining how the statute should
be interpreted. First, subsection (c), which grants immunity to publishers, is titled "Protection for 'good [s]amaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material[s]."17 This title is consistent with the scant legislative history of § 230,
stating that Congress's purpose for promulgating it was to provide "[G]ood
Samaritan" protection for providers or users of interactive computer services
for action taken to restrict access to objectionable material. 176
Stratton Oakmont had left the common law in a position whereby an
Internet service provider could be held liable as a "publisher" of defamatory
material if the provider had exercised editorial control over the contents of the
material distributed through its services. 77 Because ISPs that made attempts to
be more responsible by screening for and editing out objectionable materials
were then more vulnerable to tort liability than those that made no such attempts, ISPs were left with a strong incentive to refrain from undertaking attempts to edit out material it considered to be obscene, lewd, violent, harassing,
defamatory, or otherwise objectionable. The title to subsection (c) clearly reflects that the purpose of this subsection is, as also stated in the legislative history of § 230, to remedy that situation. Because distributors, however, by definition, do not engage in screening activities, the title to subsection (c) is, at
best, meaningless and ineffective when applied to distributor liability.

17
174
17s

176

17

Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 285 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-96 (1820).
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). See infra note 178 for the complete text of § 230(c).
H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).

See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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In addition to its title, every idea and word communicated in subsection
(c) is clearly consistent with furthering the purpose of protecting ISPs from liability on account of their good Samaritan attempts to screen for and eliminate
objectionable material.' Because such editorial activities, absent the statute,
would give rise to liability as a "publisher," interpreting the term "publisher,"
as it appears in § 230, as applying strictly to those parties who engage in such
actions is likewise consistent with furthering that purpose. Interpreting the term
also to include immunity from distributor liability, however, is not consistent
with this purpose. For example, subsection (c)(1) provides that an ISP will not
be treated as the publisher of any information provided by someone else. 79 By
guaranteeing that an ISP will not be subject to liability as a "publisher," subsection (c)(1) permits that ISP to proceed with undertaking any editing it deems
appropriate without fear that, because it did so, it would be subject to an increased risk of liability. This clearly is consistent with the purpose of protecting
ISPs from liability resulting from good Samaritan attempts to screen out objectionable materials. Similarly, subsection (c)(2)(A) provides that an ISP will not
be responsible for undertaking voluntary actions to restrict access to objectionable materials,' 8 0 activities which are, by common law definition, the activities
of a publisher. In both cases, however, liability as a distributor,by definition,
does not arise as the result of affirmatively engaging in any such activities.
Therefore, neither subsections (c)(1) nor (c)(2)(A) would have any meaning,
consistent with the stated purpose of the statute, if applied to distributors.
Another important interpretive clue concerning the language of § 230 is
that it provides protection to ISPs who undertake specific affirmative actionsit makes no express reference to relieving ISPs from failing to act where they
are otherwise. obligated to do so. While subsection (c)(1) provides a general

17

The text of subsection (c) is as follows:
(c) Protection for "good [s]amaritan" blocking and screening of offensive
material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker - No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability - No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph (1).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
19
Id. § 230(c)(1). See supra note 178 for the text of § 230(c).
1so
See supra note 178 for text of § 230(c).
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statement that an interactive computer service shall not be treated as a publisher
or speaker of information provided by someone else,' 8 the specific immunities
discussed in subsection (2) relate either to "any action voluntarily taken in good
faith" or simply "any action [under]taken."' 8 2 There is no express or specific
immunity anywhere in § 230 for failing or neglecting to undertake actions that
the ISP may otherwise be required to undertake. While publisher liability arises
from the affirmative act of exercising editorial control,' 83 distributor liability
arises when one fails to act. Specifically, it arises when the distributor fails to
act upon his actual or constructive knowledge of the defamatory content of material published by another by removing that material from the selection of publications he offers for delivery or transmission to others.' 84
Finally, the express language of the statute suggests that Congress intended it to be interpreted narrowly. The statute lists finite and definite actions
that are to be protected.' 85 In contrast, when Congress intends a list of actions
to be more expansive than expressly stated, it will typically use a phrase such
as "including, but not limited to."' 86 Likewise, when it intends the definition of
a term to be more expansive, it uses similar language. 8 7 Section 230 contains
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). See supra note 178 for text of § 230(c).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A}-{B). See supra note 178 for text of § 230(c).
183
See Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 931-32 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (finding television network affiliates not liable as a publisher where they exercised no editorial control over
network programming they rebroadcast); Misut v. Mooney, 475 N.Y.S.2d 233, 236 (1984) (finding that a printer that was not "in a position to test the truth of the statements submitted by an independent author" could not be held liable as a publisher).
184
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmts. b-g (1977).
181

18

18
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
held liable on account of - (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph

(1).").
See, e.g., 14 U.S.C. § 468 (2012) ("The Coast Guard may expend operating expense funds
for recruiting activities, including but not limited to advertising and entertainment, in order
to . . . ." (emphasis added)); 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(d)(3)(B) (2012) ("Acts, policies, and practices that
are unreasonable include, but are not limited to, any act, policy, or practice, or any combination
186

of acts, policies, or practices, which . . . denies fair and equitable . . . opportunities for the estab-

lishment of an enterprise ... ." (emphasis added)); 23 U.S.C. §152(g) (2012) ("The Secretary of
Transportation shall submit a report ... (including but not limited to any projects for pavement
marking). The report shall include, but not be limited to, the number of projects undertaken, their
distribution by cost range, road system, means and methods used, and the previous and subsequent accident experience at improved locations." (emphasis added)).
"8 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) ("The term 'obligation or other security of any foreign
government' includes, but is not limited to, uncanceled stamps, whether or not demonetized."
(emphasis added)); 40 U.S.C. § 612(a)(4) (2012) ("The term 'historical, architectural, or cultural
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no such language, strongly suggesting that Congress intended the statute to be
interpreted narrowly.
Further support in the plain language of § 230 for interpreting the statute narrowly can be found in subsection (e),' 8 8 which contains provisions expressly specifying that § 230 "shall be construed" in a manner that will neither
affect any criminal statute nor any intellectual property law.189 The fact that
Congress included, within the express terms of § 230, provisions that specifically limit the scope of the statute is further evidence that it did not want the
immunities, which the section expressly provided, to be interpreted expansively.
More importantly, however, the plain language of subsection (e)(3)
provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State
significance' includes, but is not limited to, buildings listed or eligible to be listed on the National
Register established under section 470a of Title 16." (emphasis added)); 40 U.S.C. § 512(a)(5)
("The term 'commercial activities' includes, but is not limited to, the operations of restaurants,
food stores, craft stores, dry goods stores, financial institutions, and display facilities." (emphasis
added)); 40 U.S.C. § 512(a)(6) ("The term 'cultural activities' includes, but is not limited to, film,
dramatic, dance, and musical presentations, and fine art exhibits, whether or not such activities
are intended to make a profit." (emphasis added)); 40 U.S.C. § 512(a)(7) ("The term 'educational
activities' includes, but is not limited to, the operations of libraries, schools, day care centers, laboratories, and lecture and demonstration facilities." (emphasis added)); 40 U.S.C. § 512(a)(8)
("The term 'recreational activities' includes, but is not limited to, the operations of gymnasiums
and related facilities." (emphasis added)); 22 U.S.C. § 2394(b)(1) (2012) ("'foreign assistance'
means any tangible or intangible item provided by the United States Government to a foreign
country or international organization under this chapter or any other Act, including but not limited to any training, service, or technical advice, any item of real, personal, or mixed property,
any agricultural commodity . . . ." (emphasis added)); 22 U.S.C. § 2394(b)(2) ("'provided by the
United States Government' includes, but is not limited to, foreign assistance provided by means
of gift, loan, sale, credit, or guaranty." (emphasis added)).
188
The text of § 230(e) is as follows:
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law - Nothing in this section shall be construed to
impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating
to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18,
or any other Federal criminal statute.
(2) No effect on intellectual property law - Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.
(3) State law - Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State
from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.
(4) No effect on Communications Privacy law - Nothing in this section shall
be construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar
State law.
47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2012).
See id. § 230(e)(l)-(2).
19
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from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section."o9 0 Here, Congress is clearly showing its concern that § 230 does not inadvertently infringe,
beyond the express terms of the statute, upon any state's rights to enforce its
own laws. As defamation laws, including those distinguishing distributor liability from publisher liability, are nearly exclusively states' laws, such were most
certainly within Congress's contemplation in drafting § 230. Accordingly, because § 230's express language does not protect the actions of a "distributor,"
and because the plain language of subsection (e)(3) shows Congress's clear intent to protect the states from an over expansive interpretation of § 230, it is
clear that interpreting the immunity offered to "publishers" under the statute as
including "distributors" as well is beyond the contemplation of Congress and
would therefore be inappropriate.
3.

The Legislative History

As previously discussed, the recorded legislative history of § 230 is
very scant and does not specifically address what the scope of the term "publisher" was meant to include. What little legislative history there is shows that
Congress's purpose in passing § 230 was to provide "Good Samaritan" protection for providers or users of interactive computer services for action taken to
restrict access to objectionable material. 9 ' This indicates that § 230 should be
interpreted consistent with this goal. Because interpreting the word "publisher"
as being inclusive of distributors is, at best, meaningless with regards to this
goal,192 the legislative history of § 230 offers no support for applying anything
other than the plain meaning or common law definition of the term to the statute.
4.

The Common Law's Value in Interpreting § 230

The common law distinction between publisher and distributor liability
is clear and well established.19 3 The Zeran court, however, minimized the importance of this established distinction,' 94 opining that "once a computer service provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust into the role of a traditional publisher" because it is then forced to "decide

190

See id. § 230(e)(3).

H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
See discussionsupra Part III.2.A.
193 See supra Parts II.A.2-4 for a discussion of the common law distinctions between publisher and distributor liability.
194
See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997), afJ'g 958 F. Supp. 1124
(E.D. Va. 1997) (criticizing the plaintiffs position as "attach[ing] too much importance to the
presence of the distinct notice element in distributor liability").
191
192
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whether to publish, edit, or withdraw the posting."' 95 The Zeran court, therefore, fundamentally equated the burden imposed by the common law upon distributors as that imposed upon publishers, finding that a distributor, once made
aware of defamatory content of material it is distributing, is effectively and ultimately a publisher of that material and thus covered by the immunity offered
by § 230. The Zeran court, however, failed to appropriately identify exactly
what it is that distinguishes publisher liability from distributor liability. While
both publishers and distributors have a responsibility, under the common law,
to prevent defamatory material from reaching third parties, the distinction between the two is in the circumstances, which give rise to that burden. A publisher's potential liability arises as a result of his power to exercise editorial
discretion and control over the contents of material he publishes.' 9 6 A distributor's potential liability arises, however, from his failure to remove the publication itself from distribution, when he knows or should know it has defamatory
content.'97 While the publisher controls a material's content, the distributor exercises no such control. The distributor, unlike a publisher, typically entertains
no option to alter the contents of a publication-it merely decides whether or
not to make that material available to others.' 98 This well-established common
law distinction should have been recognized and considered by the Zeran court.

19

Id.

See Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (finding television
network affiliates not liable as a publisher where they exercised no editorial control over network
programming they rebroadcast); Misut v. Mooney, 475 N.Y.S.2d 233, 236 (1984) (finding that a
printer that was not "in a position to test the truth of the statements submitted by an independent
author" could not be held liable as a publisher).
19
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 and cmts. (1977).
198
This, of course, is not to say that the entity being characterized as a distributor cannot alter
a material's contents. Sometimes a distributor has both the technological ability and legal right to
do so, but because it chooses not to engage in editorial activities, remains merely a "distributor"
of the materials and not a "publisher" of them. For example, in Auvil, 800 F. Supp. 928, discussed supra Part II.A.4, the court expressly observed that CBS's contract with its local broadcasting affiliates permitted those affiliates to exercise editorial control and censor network programming before rebroadcasting that programming locally. In spite of having the power to
exercise such control, the court noted that the local affiliates did not actually exercise that power,
and therefore could only be subject to liability as a distributor and not as a publisher-and thus
could be liable only if they knew or should have known of the broadcast's defamatory character.
Auvil, 800 F. Supp. at 931-32 (adopting the position of § 581 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts that "one who only delivers or transmits defamatory material published by a third person is
subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory [content]"). It
is, therefore, the very fact that a distributor does not edit and alter the contents of the materials he
transfers or transmits-exclusive of whether he can do so-that permits him to maintain the
characterization of a "distributor" and not a "publisher." Thus, an ISP that merely decides whether or not to [re-]transmit someone else's publication, and does not alter the contents of individual
publications it decides to transmit, by definition is a "distributor," regardless of the fact that it
may have the technological ability and legal right to make such alterations.
19
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Even if one believes, as the Zeran court did, that the common law distinction made between publishers and distributors is, in essence, a distinction
without a difference, the fact is that such a distinction has been firmly made
and well-established in the common law; regardless of the Zeran Court's efforts to minimize the differences between the two types of liability, those differences have been commonly recognized. Therefore, the Zeran court's refusal
to consider these well-established common law differences in liability between
distributors and publishers in its interpretation of §230 was an error. As articulated by the Supreme Court: "The normal rule of statutory construction is that if
Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific."199 Clearly, neither § 230 nor its legislative history make reference to any "specific intent" of Congress to change
the "judicially created" common law concepts of publisher and distributor liability. Because Congress gave no indication it intended to change these wellestablished common law concepts, § 230 must be interpreted as being consistent with the common law understanding of the term "publisher." Therefore,
interpreting the well-established and well-recognized common law term "publisher" as being inclusive of the similarly well-established term "distributor"
was inappropriate.
In addition, the status of the common law of defamation at the time §
230 was promulgated, as it applied to online communications, gives further indication of how § 230 should be interpreted. While § 230 effectively overruled
the Stratton Oakmont court's decision to subject ISPs to publisher liability
when they exercise editorial control over the content of the material they
transmit to others, Cubby v. CompuServe200 had also previously established
that, in the absence of editorial control, "the appropriate standard of [evaluating] liability" is that of distributor liability, which focuses on "whether [the
service] knew or had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory ... statements."20 1 Congress was clearly contemplating the state of the common law
when it passed § 230 to "remove the disincentives to self[-]regulation created
by the Stratton Oakmont decision., 2 02 Congress's obvious awareness of the
Stratton Oakmont decision could not have been in a vacuum-it must also have
been aware of Cubby. Yet, in spite of this knowledge, it chose only to address
expressly the "disincentives" created by Stratton Oakmont, and ignore, at least
by its express terms, the Cubby decision. This apparent conscious decision by

'"
Midlantic Nat'1 Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986); Edmonds v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979).
200
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
201
Id. at 140-41.
202
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997), af'g 958 F. Supp. 1124
(E.D. Va. 1997).
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Congress not to address the issue of Cubby supports leaving the Cubby decision
and distributor liability intact.
As shown, the plain meaning of the term "publisher," the text of § 230
in its entirety, the legislative history of § 230, and the common law all support
the assertion that the Zeran court was wrong when it interpreted Congress's §
230 grant of immunity for publisher liability to ISPs as including immunity
from liability as distributors as well. In addition to the questions of whether
Congress intended to grant immunity from distributor liability to ISPs, and
whether the Zeran Court misconstrued that intent, is the more fundamental
question of whether ISPs should be immune from distributor liability.
B.

Should § 230 Immunity From PublisherLiability Be Extended to
Distributors?

Congress clearly believed that important and legitimate public interests
would be served by its decision to grant publisher immunity to ISPs under §
230.203 Congress has not, however, outlined any public policies or interests in
favor of granting immunity to ISPs from distributor liability. While arguments
in favor of granting distributor liability to ISPs have been made by others, including the Zeran court, the weight of logic, precedent, and public policy favors not doing so.
1.

The Uniqueness of Internet Communication

Online communication through the Internet is, as compared with print
media and television, undoubtedly still a new and unique phenomenon. In spite
of this newness, however, the total number of Internet users in the United
States in 2009 exceeded 227 million-approximately 74% of the total population of the country.2 04 These millions of users communicate through a "decentralized, global medium of communications-or 'cyberspace'-that links people, institutions, corporations, and governments around the world." 205 Each of
203
Congress's purpose in promulgating § 230 was to provide "Good Samaritan" protection for
providers or users of interactive computer services for actions taken to restrict access to objectionable material by "remov[ing] the disincentives to selq-]regulation created by the Stratton
Oakmont decision." See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996). It was to
"encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their
services." Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. With its concern that decisions like Stratton Oakmont would
"deter service providers from blocking and screening offensive material," Congress enacted §
230 to "grant immunity to interactive computer service providers from suits arising from efforts
by those providers to screen or block content." Id.; Zeran, 958 F. Supp 1124, 1134 (E.D. Va.
1997).
204
United States ofAmerica Internet Usage and Broadband Usage Report, INTERNET WORLD
STATS, http://www.intemetworldstats.com/am/us.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
205
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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these Internet users has the ability to communicate, almost instantaneously, to
specific individuals, broader groups of people, or to the world as a whole.206 No
single entity administers the Internet-no government, corporation, non-profit
group, or educational consortium has any centralized control over all of the
communication that takes place on a daily basis through this medium. 20 7 Similarly, the Internet has no centralized location, control point, or communications
channel.2 08
There is, however, nothing so inherently unique in the technology of
the Internet that would justify not applying traditional distributor liability to
online communications. Compare the processes involved in publishing and distributing a city newspaper with the processes of distributing materials online. In
the physical world, when a person has written an article or opinion, that person
has traditionally transmitted his or her work, usually by postal mail or other
carrier, 209 to a newspaper for publication. Similarly, an article or comment written by an ISP subscriber is transmitted, albeit electronically, to the ISP's computer systems. While the article submitted to the newspaper will likely be examined by an editor who will determine whether or not to publish and
distribute it, the ISP will generally, through a series of programming commands, simply distribute the article it receives. The technology used by the ISP
makes this a very quick and easy process to complete. However, even though
the physical processes of printing and distributing a newspaper are more cumbersome, there is nothing intrinsic to those processes that require an article's
contents to be reviewed by an editor before the article is typeset, printed, and
distributed. If the newspaper were to so choose, it could simply route all incoming articles to its production department for publication and distribution,
much like ISPs do with materials transmitted to them. Similarly, an ISP could
use its technology to require every message posted to an ISP's bulletin board or
generally distributed through the ISP to be reviewed by an "editor" before the
contents of those messages are distributed. Therefore, while the technologies
utilized by the two media are different, the scope of control over the contents of
material published and distributed by those media, afforded by each one's
available technology, are essentially the same.
There is, of course, one primary difference between a newspaper's ability to control the content of its newspapers and the ISP's ability to control the
material that passes through its systems. While the editorial staff of a major city
newspaper may have to read through and edit up to 100 articles daily to assure
206

id

207

Id. at 832.

208

id.

209
With the advent of e-mail and related methods of transmitting messages, even articles
submitted to newspapers are, undoubtedly, being more and more frequently transmitted electronically, rather than through the mail or other form of physical delivery.
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there is no defamatory content, assuring no objectionable materials pass
through an ISP may require reviewing hundreds of thousands, and perhaps millions, of messages daily. Though it is clearly technologically possible to undertake this level of editorial control, it may realistically be economically unfeasible to do so. Exercising this level of editorial control, however, would only be
necessary if the ISP were subject to liability as a publisher. Protecting itself
against distributorliability would be much less of an economic burden.
Generally, a distributor, such as a newsstand, bookstore, or library, has
no affirmative duty to examine, for defamatory content, the various publications being offered.210 It is only when "facts or circumstances" would suggest
that a particular publication contains matter which, upon inspection, a reasonable man would recognize as defamatory, that a duty arises for the distributor to
make an inspection of the materials he is distributing. 21' Therefore, a traditional
distributor of publications need not, under ordinary circumstances, concern
himself with the contents of the materials he is distributing. The reason for this
has its basis in the First Amendment and the public interest in assuring that
publications and information are readily available for dissemination to the public. According to the Supreme Court, "the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing [strict liability on
distributors for the contents of the material they carry]" 2 12 because to impose
liability upon one who merely distributes material that turns out to contain a defamatory statement would force every bookseller to make himself aware of the
contents of every book in his shop. Ultimately, under those circumstances, "the
bookseller's burden would become the public's burden" because by restricting
the materials he offered the public to those he had personally inspected, the material offered "might be depleted indeed." 2 13
The same logic clearly holds true for ISPs. Though the technology is
different, the principles, policy, and logic are the same. As with bookstores,
forcing ISPs to refrain from transmitting any messages they have not reviewed
would likely result in a virtual depletion of available online materials. Unlike
bookstores, however, holding an ISP liable for failing to remove contents that it
has reason to know are defamatory should have little effect on the amount of
210

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

211

id

§ 581 cmts. d-e (1977).

Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959), rev'g 327 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1958) (striking
down an ordinance imposing liability upon a bookseller for possessing an obscene book, regardless of whether the bookseller had knowledge of the book's contents).
213
Id. at 153. Though Smith involved criminal liability, the First Amendment's guarantees are
equally applicable to civil defamation cases. As recognized by the Supreme Court: "What a State
may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach
of its civil laws of libel. The fear of damage awards . . . may be markedly more inhibiting than
the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
277 (1964), rev'g 144 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1962).
212
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online resources available to the public. While there may be a legitimate argument that imposing distributor liability upon an ISP will result in increased
costs for investigating complaints, these types of costs are born by every other
communications medium and should be considered among the ISP's costs of
doing business. 214
2.

Free Speech

Arguing in favor of granting immunity from distributor liability to
ISPs, the Zeran court opined that imposing distributor liability upon ISPs
would deter free speech on this "new and burgeoning Internet medium.,,2 15
Clearly, maintaining free speech on the Internet is an important goal. It cannot,
however, be any more important than the goals of maintaining free speech in
other media, such as newspapers, magazines, television, and radio programming. As important as the policy of encouraging free speech is, parties from
each of these media have been, and continue to be, subject to liability as distributors. The "free speech" concerns related to defamation liability, as applied
to more traditional media, have been addressed by the Supreme Court. In balancing First Amendment concerns with the often irreversible harm that can result from defamatory statements, the Supreme Court has recognized that
"[s]ociety has a strong and pervasive interest in preventing and redressing attack upon reputation," and has repeatedly upheld plaintiffs' rights to proceed in
defamation claims.216 Justice Potter Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Ros214
It is hard to imagine that bearing the financial burden of investigating complaints would
significantly compromise an ISP's profitability. America Online, for example, posted fourthquarter profits last year of $57.3 million dollars. AOL's Fourth-QTR. Profits Hit $57.3 Million,
N.Y. POST, Aug. 5, 1998, at 36. In its last fiscal year AOL collected revenues of $1.4 billion; this
year they should reach $2.5 billion. Marc Gunther, The Internet is Mr. Case's Neighborhood,
FORTUNE, Mar. 30, 1998, at 68. Furthermore, shareholders who invested $1,000 in AOL at the
end of 1993 saw their investment increase to $84,856 by the close of 1998. Thomas E. Weber,
Best and Worst Performing Companies: Best 5-Year Runner-Up America Online, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 25, 1999, at R7.
215
See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997), aff'g 958 F. Supp. 1124
(E.D. Va. 1997) (opining that "[t]he purpose of [§ 230] is not difficult to discern. Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning
Internet medium. The imposition of tort liability on service providers for the communication of
others represented . .. simply another form of intrusive government regulation of speech. . . .").
216
See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (finding that a "reasonable
fact finder could conclude that statements in reporter's column implied assertion that high school
coach perjured himself in judicial proceeding, and implication that coach committed perjury was
sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false and might permit defamation
recovery"); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (holding that "the speech or debate
clause did not protect transmittal of the allegedly defamatory material in press releases and newsletters issued by a senator"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that "a
newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a
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enblatt v. Baer,2 17 discussed how "[t]he destruction that defamatory falsehood
can bring is, to be sure, often beyond the capacity of the law to redeem." 2 18 If
this is so powerful a concept that it overpowers the First Amendment rights of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press when applied to newspaper publishers with thousands of subscribers and newsstand owners with perhaps fewer
than one hundred customers, how much more powerful is it-and how much
more is the potential for "unredeemable" damage to occur- when applied to
circumstances where defamatory material is made available to millions of Internet users? Clearly, any validity in the Supreme Court's disfavoring a publisher's or distributor's First Amendment rights, in favor of protecting a person's reputation in the sight of fewer than a hundred people, can be no less
valid than a court's doing the same to protect that person's reputation to a potentially vastly larger audience.
3.

The "Practical Application" of Imposing Distributor Liability
Upon ISPs

The facts of Zeran suggest that, had the court held that § 230 was not
intended to provide ISPs immunity from liability as a distributor, AOL would
probably have been found liable. The messages attributing the offering of tshirts featuring offensive and tasteless slogans related to the Oklahoma City
bombing to Zeran21 9 were, without a doubt, defamatory. Likewise, Zeran's repeated phone conversations with AOL representatives, and their promises that
the messages would be removed, 2 20 both of which were undisputed by AOL,
clearly show that AOL had knowledge of the postings and their defamatory
content. Not all cases, however, are likely to have facts as easy to evaluate as
Zeran. In many cases, it may be difficult for an ISP to readily determine whether a posting in which it has received a complaint is, in fact, actually defamatory
public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against liability, for
injury inflicted, on the ground of a privilege protecting discussion of any public issue without
regard to the status of a person defamed therein").
217
383 U.S. 75 (1966).
218
Id. at 92-93 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart explained:
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified
invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any
decent system of ordered liberty ... The destruction that defamatory falsebood can bring is, to be sure, often beyond the capacity of the law to redeem.
Yet, imperfect though it is, an action for damages is the only hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man whose reputation has been falsely
dishonored.

Id.
219
220

See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d at 329; see also discussionsupra Part II.B.4.
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329; see also discussionsupra Part II.B.4.
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in content. Arguing against imposing distributor liability upon ISPs, the Zeran
Court insightfully opined:
If computer service providers were subject to distributor liability, they would face potential liability each time they receive
notice of a potentially defamatory statement-from any party,
concerning any message. Each notification would require a
careful yet rapid investigation of the circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment concerning the information's defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial
decision whether to risk liability by allowing the continued
publication of that information. Although this might be feasible
for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of postings
on interactive computer services would create an impossible
burden in the Internet context. Because service providers
would be subject to liability only for the publication of information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive simply to remove messages u on notification, whether
the contents were defamatory or not.
The concern expressed by the Zeran court is one of practical importance. If ISPs were simply to remove every posting about which they received a complaint, so as to avoid any chance of liability, then there certainly
would be a "chilling effect," not only on the freedom of Internet speech, but also on the amount of legitimate non-defamatory materials available to Internet
users. Furthermore, if ISPs merely remove every posting about which it received a complaint, there would almost certainly be an impact upon the "true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development,
and myriad avenues for intellectual activity" currently available on the Internet, 2 22 as anyone holding a view differing from the political, social, religious or
otherwise divergent view expressed in a posting could have that posting removed merely by complaining to the ISP that it was defamatory.
The question, therefore, is whether imposing distributor liability upon
ISPs would require, as a practical legal matter, ISPs to engage in such extreme
measures. More directly, the inquiry is: can distributor liability be imposed upon ISPs while still preserving the free and open exchange of ideas now available to users of this unique forum? The common law development of defamation
law, the power of courts to make and change law, and Congress's inherent
power to legislate all suggest that this can be done.

See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (internal citations omitted).
In proffering § 230, Congress found the Internet offered a forum for such diverse exchanges of ideas and thoughts. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2012).
221
222
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Courts applying common law principles in defamation actions have often been required to wrestle with tough issues. Issues such as reconciling the
First Amendment rights of defendants with the public's interest in "preventing
and redressing attacks upon reputation," 223 determining whether it is just to
hold one who merely delivers or transmits defamatory material to another to the
standard of care as one who actually publishes the material,224 and deciding
whether scrutinizing materials for nudity, profanity, and vulgarity established
editorial activities sufficient to establish a basis for publisher liability,225 are all
issues courts have needed to address. Additionally, they are issues that at one
time were just as novel and challenging as any issues likely to arise as a result
of imposing distributor liability upon ISPs.
When considering the practicality of imposing distributor liability upon
ISPs, it is essential to remember that distributor liability would only be realized
when the ISP "knows or has reason to know" 226 of the defamatory content of
material it has transmitted. This standard implies an inquiry into reasonableness. For example, a court may conclude that a local newsstand owner has
"reason to know" that a newspaper it is distributing contains defamatory content once that newsstand owner is informed of that content by a customer. Under those circumstances, the court could find it is reasonable to expect the
newsstand owner to review the content of the questioned material to determine
whether the contents could reasonably be considered defamatory.
Consider, however, if instead of a local newsstand owner, the defendant was the owner of a 500 store national chain of used book stores who, on a
daily basis, received numerous phone calls, each complaining about defamatory
content in a different book in stock at a different store. Consider then, that for
many months the owner investigated each complaint, only to find that each
time there was no defamatory content in the book, and that the books only contained diverse political or social views that were controversial; therefore, because the complaints virtually never turned up defamatory material, the owner
of the book stores stopped investigating phone calls complaining of defamatory
content in books. Under those circumstances, a court may then apply a reasonableness standard and find that a mere phone call complaining of defamatory
content in a particular book is not likely to cause the owner to "know or have
reason to know" of that book's actual defamatory content. Furthermore, the
court could find it reasonable, under these circumstances, that the bookstore
223 See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 (recognizing that "[s]ociety has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation").
224
See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959) (striking down an ordinance imposing liability upon a bookseller for possessing an obscene book, regardless of whether the
bookseller had knowledge of the book's contents).
225
See Misut v. Mooney, 475 N.Y.S.2d 233, 236 (1984).
226
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1977).
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owner did not undertake an investigation to determine if there actually was defamatory content in the book. The same court, however, could find that if the
owner received 100 phone calls related to the alleged defamatory material of a
single book, or perhaps received a certified letter from a complaining person's
attorney, that the owner did "have reason" to know of that book's defamatory
content and that the reasonable action would have been for him to investigate
the matter further.
If courts outside the Fourth Circuit reject the Zeran decision and permit
distributor liability to be applied to ISPs, then the courts are likely to make distinctions in much the same way as the hypothetical court in the foregoing scenario did. Exactly where lines would be drawn may be different, but the fact is
that those lines can, and should, be drawn-they can and should be drawn in a
manner that reasonably protects individuals' reputations while still preserving
the free and open exchange of ideas and thoughts among users of this new forum.
These lines could, of course, also be drawn by Congress. By legislating
specific standards, Congress could eliminate some of the uncertainty that would
take many years for the courts to resolve.227 In addition to legislating to clarify
distinctions previously unresolved by the common law, Congress could also initiate alternate ways of resolving disputes involving defamatory content of Internet postings-ways that may allow an aggrieved party to defend satisfactorily its reputation without necessarily initiating litigation. For example, Congress
could require ISPs to provide the opportunity for one who alleges he is being
defamed to have his rebuttal to the alleged defamatory material electronically
"attached" or "linked" to the material he alleges is defamatory. Such a scheme
could closely parallel the rights a debtor has to have his comments attached to a
disputed account listed on his credit report.228
While there are undoubtedly a myriad of ideas regarding how Congress
could legislate to protect persons from defamatory Internet postings, there are
differing views as to whether Congress should even be involved in regulating
matters pertaining to Internet communication.
C.

Should Congress Regulate ISPs andInternet Communication?

The uniqueness of the Internet and online communication-its millions
of users, the international nature of its impact, and its decentralized structure229-has led some to argue that existing rules and laws should be inapplica227
While Congress has, on occasion, passed legislation related to the Internet, it has recognized that "[t]he Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit
of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation." 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4).
228
See 15 U.S.C. § 168 1i(6)(B)(iv) (2012).
229
See supra Part III.B. 1 for a discussion of the Internet's "uniqueness."
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ble to it.230 Many argue that the world of online communication has emerged
into its own "place" 23 1 and therefore should not be subject to the laws of other
"places," such as those of any individual country or state. According to David
R. Johnson and David Post, Co-Directors of the Cyberspace Law Institute,232
"treating [this] Cyberspace as a separate [']space['] to which distinct laws apply should come naturally."233 They opine that:
Cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally significant (online) phenomena and physical location.
The rise of the global computer network is destroying the link
between geographical location and: (1) the power of local governments to assert control over online behavior; (2) the effects
of online behavior on individuals or things; (3) the legitimacy
of a local sovereign's efforts to regulate global phenomena;
and (4) the ability of physical location to give notice of which
sets of rules apply. The Net thus radically subverts the system
of rule-making based on borders between physical spaces, at
least with respect to the claim that Cyberspace should naturally
be governed by territorially defined rules. 4
Applying their view of Internet communications to defamation law,
Johnson and Post argue:
Treating messages on the Net as transmissions from one place
to another has created a quandary for those concerned about liability for defamation: Messages may be transmitted between
countries with very different laws, and liability may be imposed on the basis of "publication" in multiple jurisdictions
with varying standards. In contrast, the approach that treats the
global network as a separate place would consider any allegedly defamatory message to have been published only "on the
Net" (or in some distinct subsidiary area thereof)-at least until such time as distribution on paper occurs. This recharacterization makes more sense. A person who uploads a
potentially defamatory statement would be more able to determine the rules applicable to his own actions. Moreover, because the Net has distinct characteristics, including an enhanced ability of the allegedly defamed person to reply, the
230
See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise ofLaw in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1400-02 (1996).
231
Id. at 1378-79.
232
See id. at 1367 nn.*-**.
233
234

Id. at 1379.
Id. at 1370.
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rules of defamation developed for the Net could take into account these technological capabilities-perhaps by requiring
that the opportunity for reply be taken advantage of in lieu of
monetary compensation. 235
While there is undoubtedly "uniqueness" in Internet communication,
there is nothing so inherently unique to this medium that justifies a wholesale
discounting of traditional defamation law. First, even if one concedes that the
virtual world of "Cyberspace" is a unique place, when one enters that world he
or she does not also leave the physical world. A person in Minnesota logging
onto the Internet from his home computer does not leave Minnesota in order to
gain access to the world of Cyberspace. Similarly, an ISP in Virginia whose
equipment and services are being used by the user in Minnesota to communicate in Cyberspace is always present in Virginia-its equipment, personnel,
management, facilities, and decision-making are always present in the physical
world. Though the effects of any tortious activity of either the user in Minnesota or the ISP in Virginia may first be evident in Cyberspace, the tortious activity itself-the typing in of defamatory communications, or the decision not to
remove that communication-take place in the physical world, and therefore
should be subject to the laws that would otherwise control such activity.
Furthermore, the consequences of defamatory statements posted to Cyberspace frequently have consequences in the real world, even absent any conversion of that statement to hard copy. For example, a message distributed
through an ISP that falsely accuses a person of being a convicted child-molester
will likely cause that person's reputation to suffer in the minds of anyone who
reads that message, even if that message is never transformed from its electronic form to paper hard copy.
Second, there is nothing inherently unique in the fact that the Internet is
an international medium that crosses boundaries between countries and states
with different laws. One only need visit any mall or airport newsstand to see
the plethora of newspapers and magazine, which are distributed internationally.
Similarly, radio and television broadcasts are hardly stopped by lines drawn on
a map. Communications by telephone routinely cross interstate and international borders. In each of these situations, however, liability for communicating
messages with defamatory content may be imposed.
The concern regarding this international medium being subject to "territorial applied rules" is, therefore, not new or unique. Any tortious conduct
that touches on multiple jurisdictions is inherently more complex to resolve
than one that is confined by parties, locations, and actions to only one jurisdiction. These inter-jurisdictional issues and challenges, however, have not resulted in a suspension of justice. International treaties and common law practices

235

Id. at 1381-82.
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have helped courts resolve such issues between parties of different countries. 2 3 6
Similarly, within this country, concepts such as "minimum contacts" have controlled whether a state may exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.237 There simply is no reason why these same principles cannot be applied
to tortious conduct that is facilitated through online communications.238
IV. CONCLUSION

Courts outside the Fourth Circuit considering the issue of whether an
ISP can be subject to distributor liability for knowingly permitting its computer
systems to be used for distributing defamatory material should reject the Zeran
Court's interpretation of § 230 and should impose liability consistent with the
rules applicable to defamation actions under the common law. 23 9 This should be

For example, the Vienna Convention addresses what a member state must do when a foreign national is arrested within its jurisdiction. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and
Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force
with respect to the United States of America, Dec. 24, 1969). Similarly, The Berne Convention,
the Trade-Related Aspects of International Property ("TRIPS") Agreement under the World
Trade Organization, and the new WIPO Copyright Treaty each impact upon international disputes involving intellectual property. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Sept. 6, 1886, 25 U.N.T.S. 221; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 14(1), Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65.
237
According to the Supreme Court, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process requires that a nonresident defendant have "minimum contacts" with the forum state before a court in that state can
exercise personal jurisdiction over that defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). This does not require the actual physical presence of the defendant in
the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). It does, however,
require some act by which "the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). A defendant "purposely avails" itself of the privileges of
conducting activities in the forum state when the actions of the defendant "create a substantial
connection with the forum state," Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, such that the defendant "should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
238
For example, a person in New Jersey who sends out letters to all residents of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, claiming that the Mayor of Philadelphia has engaged in unlawful fund raising
would likely be considered to have "minimum contacts" with Pennsylvania, such that he "should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
291, 297. Under these circumstances, a Pennsylvania court could exercise jurisdiction over that
New Jersey defendant. See id. Similarly, there is no reason that the same standard couldn't be
applied when that same defendant engages in the same activity, but rather than use the mail to
facilitate his tortious conduct, he uses the Internet.
239
To date, several courts have decidedly rejected or otherwise declined to follow the Zeran
court's decision. See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 416, 427 (App. 1 Dist. Oct 15,
2003); Grace v. eBay Inc., 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 192, 201 (App. 2 Dist. Jul 22, 2004); Chi. Lawyers'
Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008).
236
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done for several reasons. First, the theories that underlie distributor liability
support subjecting ISPs to that liability where they fail to remove electronic
publications known to contain defamatory content. Under the common law, liability for defamation is based upon the concept of fault.240 An individual who
originates a defamatory message may be said to be "at fault" for damaging another person's reputation by communicating that message to a third person.24'
Similarly, a publisher is at fault when he furthers that harm by "re-publishing"
the statement. 242 A distributor who merely delivers or transmits a publication
containing defamatory material, however, is generally deemed not to be at fault
for any harm caused by that defamatory content. The exception to this is that a
distributor is deemed to be at fault if but only if he distributes material, which
he knows or has reason to know is defamatory in nature.243
The reasons and rationale for subjecting distributors of traditional media to these ruleS244 lose none of their validity when they are applied to ISPs. 24 5
Though it would be unreasonable to expect an ISP to screen every (re-) transmission for defamatory content, there is nothing inherent in the technology of
online communications that should relieve ISPs from the obligation to remove
postings from their systems once they have actual or constructive knowledge of
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (stating "so long as they do not
impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriated standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a[n] [ ] individual").
241 See WADE ET AL., supra note 20, at 847-48 n.2; Economopoulos v. A.G. Pollard Co., 105
N.E. 896, 896 (Mass. 1914) (finding that there was no publication of a defamatory statement,
made in English, because of those who heard the statement, only the defendant spoke and understood the English language); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 568, 577 and cmts.
240

(1977).
242
Cianci v. New York Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Hoover v.
Peerless Publ'n, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
243
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1977).
244
These reasons for this are clear and sound-to impose liability upon a distributor that has
no actual or constructive knowledge of a publication's defamatory content would force an unreasonable obligation upon every bookseller, newsstand owner, local television network affiliate,
etc., to limit the materials it made available to the public to those which the distributor had actually screened for defamatory content. Ultimately, because of distributors' fear of liability, the
public's access to media such as books, newspapers, and television programming would likely
become severely restricted. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959). The rule limiting a distributor's liability to situations where he has actual or constructive knowledge of a publication's defamatory content is, therefore, a sound rule-it recognizes that, though it may be unreasonable to expect a distributor to investigate every publication he offers for defamatory
content, once he does have actual or constructive knowledge of such content, he has an obligation to protect third parties' reputations by refusing to distribute that publication. Therefore, only
then, is he is deemed to be at fault, along with the originator and publisher of the defamatory material, for any harm that comes to a third person's reputation as a result of his knowingly distributing the defamatory materials.
245
See discussionsupra Part III.B. 1.
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the defamatory nature of the posting's contents.246 Similarly, any concerns for
free speech that such actions would raise are not new or unique to Internet
communications-they have existed, have been wrestled with, and have already been addressed in the context of more traditional media.247 Because "the
destruction that defamatory falsehood can bring is, to be sure, often beyond the
capacity of the law to redeem,"248 courts, including the Supreme Court, have
wisely favored protecting persons' reputations over the First Amendment rights
of distributors of defamatory materials.24 9 Clearly, if it is valid to disfavor a distributor's First Amendment rights in favor of protecting a person's reputation in
the sight of perhaps fewer than a hundred people who may purchase a newspaper containing defamatory content from that distributor, it is at least as valid a
proposition to disfavor an ISP's First Amendment rights in favor of protecting
that same person's reputation in the sight of perhaps millions of Internet users.250
The second reason that courts deciding this issue should reject the Zeran court's decision is that it was wrongly decided. The Zeran court determined
that the immunity from liability as a publisher afforded to ISPs through § 230
included immunity from liability as a distributor as well. 251 In making this determination, however, the Zeran court overlooked or discounted a number of
significant factors. First, the plain meaning of the term "publisher" is not difficult to discern. 2 52 It has a distinct meaning in its common usage-"publisher"
means "publisher," and not "publisher and distributor." Second, the title and
legislative history of § 230 both indicate that Congress's contemplation in
promulgating it was to protect ISPs that chose to screen out obscene, lewd, violent, harassing, defamatory, or otherwise objectionable materials from being
subject to liability because of those efforts. Interpreting the word simply as
"publisher" is consistent with that goal. Expanding that interpretation to "publisher and distributor," however, adds nothing towards furthering the contemplated purpose of the statute. Third, Congress, by express terms, made clear its
intent that § 230 should be interpreted narrowly, 25 and expanding the term
"publisher" to encompass both "publisher and distributor" would be incon-

See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
248
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 93 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
249
See, e.g., Rosenblalt, 383 U.S. 75.
250
See discussionsupra Part III.B.2.
251
See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1997), aff'g 958 F. Supp.
1124 (E.D. Va. 1997).
252
See discussionsupra Part III.A. 1.
253
See discussionsupra Part III.A.2-3.
254
See discussionsupra Part III.A.2.
246
247
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sistent with that intent. Fourth, because the terms "publisher" and "distributor"
have distinct and well-established meanings in the common law, 2 5 5 and Congress gave no indication it intended to change those meanings,256 the Zeran
court was obligated to interpret those terms consistent with their common-law
meanings.257 Finally, though the Zeran court recognized that Congress passed §
230 to "remove the [publisher liability] disincentives to self[-]regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision," 2 58 it failed to recognize that Congress
must also have been aware of the Cubby v. CompuServe259 decision, which imposed distributorliability upon ISPs 2 60-even with knowledge of the existence
of established distributor liability for ISPs, Congress chose to expressly grant
ISPs immunity only from publisher liability. 2 6 1
A third consideration in support of courts rejecting the Zeran decision
and imposing distributor liability upon ISPs is that, in doing so, there are no
"practical" matters which would make imposing that liability unreasonably difficult. 2 62 There simply is nothing in the technology of online communications
that would prevent ISPs from removing electronic publication which they know
or have reason to know are defamatory in content, and there are no questions
likely to be raised which would be beyond the ability of courts to resolve.264
For all these reasons, courts considering whether an ISP can be subject
to liability as a distributor should reject Zeran and apply the common law rules
of distributor liability to the cases before them. Additionally, Congress has the
power, and should exercise that power, to eliminate the uncertainty created by

See discussionsupra Part III.A.4.
See discussionsupra Part III.A.4.
257
Midlantic Nat'l. Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986); Edmonds v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979); see also discussion supra
Part III.A.4.
258
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997), aff'g 958 F. Supp. 1124
(E.D. Va. 1997).
259
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
260
Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140-41.
261
See discussionsupra Part III.B.2.
262
See discussionsupra Part III.B.3.
263
See discussion supraPart III.B. 1.
264
See discussion supra Part III.C. Though courts imposing distributor liability upon ISPs will
undoubtedly need to wrestle with some tough issues, such as what would give rise to an ISP's
having a "reason to know" of a posting's defamatory content, it is the role of the courts to do just
that. Tough issues have been at the heart of many previous decisions related to defamation cases.
The mere fact that applying distributor liability to ISPs is likely to raise more issues requiring
resolution is no reason to suppress the fact that all the rationales and justifications that have warranted subjecting traditional media to distributor liability apply equally to ISPs. See discussion
supra Part III.C.
255
256
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the Zeran court's interpretation of § 230.265 Just as Congress promulgated § 230
to "remove the disincentives to selfi-]regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision,"266 it should modify § 230 to expressly exclude distributor liability from the immunities the section affords ISPs, thereby removing the confusion created by the misguided interpretation of § 230 by the Zeran court.

See discussionsupra Part III.C.
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997), aff'g 958 F. Supp. 1124
(E.D. Va. 1997).
265
266
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